Kfar Etzion Before the Kidnappings, There Was a
Massacre
How
the national trauma of Kfar Etzion helped bring Israeli Yeshiva boys to the
West Bank
The slaughter on May 13, 1948, by Arab
militiamen from nearby villages and Jordanian Legionnaires of dozens of
surrendering Jewish troops in Kibbutz Kfar Etzion was probably the biggest Arab
massacre of Jews in the first Arab-Israeli War.
A year later, in the early morning hours
of the fourth day of Iyar, 5709 (May 3, 1949), the first anniversary, in the
Hebrew calendar, of the fall of the kibbutz, Col. Shlomo Goren, the IDF chief
rabbi, accompanied by a minyan of young Jerusalemites, held a
commemorative service on an Israeli hilltop from which could be seen, in the
distance, the ruins of the Etzion Bloc. The “bloc” of four kibbutzim—Kfar
Etzion, Ein Tzurim, Massu’ot Yitzhak, and Revadim—had been established between
1943 and 1947 in the Judaean hills, amid a cluster of Arab villages in the
southern part of the West Bank, which Jordan had occupied in May 1948 and which
Israel was to conquer in June 1967. The bloc was located in the heartland of
the biblical Land of Israel, between
Kfar Etzion, Ein Tzurim, Massu’ot Yitzhak,
Memorial candles were lit, chapters of the Mishna were
read out, and el maleh rahamim (merciful God), a Jewish prayer
for the dead, was chanted. The assembled fired shots in the air “in memory of
those martyred in the Etzion Bloc.” They were commemorating the 151 Jewish
fighters—of whom 21 were women—killed during the two-day battle; 127 of them
died on the second day of the battle, May 13, 1948, the day before the State of
Israel was established and proclaimed. Of these, most were murdered in the
center of Kfar Etzion, the core settlement of the bloc, while surrendering or
after they had surrendered.
The bloc, and especially Kfar Etzion and
its southeastern outpost, the disused “Russian Monastery,” had been a thorn in
the side of the Palestinians, who had battled the Haganah during the civil-war
half of the 1948 War during November 1947-May 1948. The bloc was besieged by
Arab irregulars between December 1947 and May 1948; re-supply was possible only
from the air (the bloc had a small airstrip). Most of the four settlements’
women and children were evacuated inland. Periodically, the bloc’s defenders
had fired on Arab vehicles along the Bethlehem-Hebron road. This riled the
Palestinians.
But the bloc was also a problem for the
Arab Legion, Jordan’s British-financed, -equipped, and -led army. During World
War II Jordan’s King Abdullah, an ally of Britain’s, had “loaned” the British a
number of Arab Legion companies, which the British, short of manpower, had used
to guard installations around the Middle East. In 1945-1948, these companies
were deployed by the British and then challenged by an insurgency of Jewish
guerrillas/terrorists, the IZL (irgun zva’I leumi, or National Military
Organization) and LHI (lohamei herut yisrael, or Freedom Fighters of
Israel), to guard their bases and roads in Palestine. One of these was the
Bethlehem-Hebron road, which was a segment of the
Jerusalem-Beersheba-Rafah-Suez Canal axis, through which the British and the
Legion were supplied from Britain’s Suez-Canal-side bases and along which part
of the final British withdrawal from Palestine, scheduled to be completed by
May 15, 1948, was to take place.
By May 1948, the Legionnaires should have
left Palestine completely as the British steadily shipped their troops home.
But the British needed them to secure the roads until the last moment, and
Abdullah, who intended to occupy the West Bank on the heels of the British
departure, had an interest in keeping them west of the River Jordan as an
advance guard for his army. He was also interested in securing the
Jerusalem-Beersheba road. So, several Legion companies were still in the
Hebron-Bethlehem area in the first half of May. Attacks by the bloc’s defenders
in Legion vehicles traveling along the road during April and early May
highlighted the future threat posed by the bloc. Besides, the whole area south
of Bethlehem had been earmarked by the U.N. General Assembly partition resolution of
Nov. 29, 1947, for Arab sovereignty; neither the Palestinians nor Abdullah
wanted a cluster of armed Jewish settlements on their territory.
Hence, on the morning of May 12, 1948,
probably after getting a green light from the British, two Arab Legion
companies—backed by more than a dozen gun-mounting armored cars (to which the
bloc’s defenders had no real answer) and mortars, and supported by hundreds of
Palestinian militiamen—attacked Kfar Etzion and its outposts at the southern
end of the bloc. The 150-odd Jewish defenders were badly outgunned, and their
positions were demolished and overrun one after another. The defenders put up a
stiff fight. But by noon of May 13 the armored cars had taken the Russian
Monastery and penetrated the perimeter fences and trench-works and reached the
center of Kfar Etzion.
The defenders understood the game was up.
Many laid down their weapons and, carrying white sheets, assembled in the
kibbutz’s central courtyard (though some defenders in outlying posts held on,
and perhaps continued firing, unaware that the main body was surrendering). One
survivor recalled: “The defenders began assembling between the [disused German]
Monastery and the school building. The first Arabs began arriving. They ordered
[us] to sit and afterwards to stand up and raise our arms. One Arab pointed a
Tommy-gun at us and another wanted to throw a grenade, but others stopped them.
This was taken as another proof that they intended to take us prisoner. A
cameraman in European dress, wearing a white kaffiya, appeared and photographed
us. Then an armored car, mounting machineguns, arrived … and halted near the
school. As soon as the photographer stopped work, firing began from all
directions. Those not hit in the first fusillade fled in various directions. A
few ran to the cellar, some took up arms again. A mass of Arabs rushed in from
all sides and attacked the people in the center of the settlement and in the
outposts shouting wildly ‘Deir Yassin’.”
A month before, on April 9, IZL and LHI
troops had attacked and conquered the village of Deir Yassin, just west of
Jerusalem. Dozens of women and children were killed during and after the
battle, and ‘Deir Yassin’ became a rallying cry and a cry for revenge among
Palestine Arabs—and to this day ‘Deir Yassin’ is regarded by many Palestinians
as the symbolic core and locus of the 1948 War or Nakba (catastrophe).
In the 1950s, the IDF History Branch
appointed Maj. Yitzhak Yakobson, a staff officer, to study the Etzion Bloc
battle. In his comprehensive report, “The Etzion Bloc in the War of
Independence,” he described how three of the prisoners in the courtyard managed
to escape and make it to Massu’ot Yitzhak or into the hands of Legion officers
who protected them. Another survivor, “Aviva F.,” described how a Legion
officer saved her from two Arabs who tried to rape her and shot them both dead
and then proceeded to finish off a number of wounded Jews he encountered as he
led her to safety. The survivors also testified that Legionnaires had
participated in the massacre alongside militiamen.
Yakobson, basing himself on subsequent
Legionnaires’ testimony, noted that two Legionnaires had been injured while
(unsuccessfully) trying to save three Jews, and other Legionnaires had killed a
number of militiamen in firefights. But Yakobson concluded that “first and
foremost, the massacre had stemmed from a savage mentality and thirst for
revenge and Jewish blood, and was a direct successor of the massacre [of Jews]
in Hebron in 1929,” when, as part of the statewide anti-Jewish riots, an Arab
mob murdered 66 unarmed ultra-Orthodox Jews.
For his part, the British commander of the
Arab Legion, Gen. John Glubb, subsequently offered a number of versions of what
had happened. In The Times (London), on July 2, 1968, he wrote
simply: “Not a single Jew was massacred at Kfar Etzion.” But earlier, in his A
Soldier With the Arabs (1957), Glubb wrote (perhaps hinting at
excesses): “The Arab Legion treated all Jews as prisoners of war. As soon as
the Arab Legion withdrew, the villagers of the Hebron district looted the
Jewish colonies, leaving not one stone upon another. These colonies had been so
aggressive that they had deliberately compelled Arab retaliation.” The British
minister in Amman, Alec Kirkbride, (falsely) cabled London that “the Arab
Legion [had] prevented massacre of inhabitants and looting of colonies which
would otherwise have been their fate at the hands of the local Arabs.” The
commander of the Legion’s 6th Battalion,Abdullah el Tell, who had
commanded the assault on Kfar Etzion, was marginally more truthful. He wrote in
his memoirs, The Memoirs of Abdullah Tall (1960): “The remaining
Jewish combatants continued to resist from a fortified position. This forced
our soldiers to kill all of them. We took only three prisoners. All the Jewish
combatants were killed.”
David Ben-Gurion later said that the dead
of the Etzion Bloc had “saved Jerusalem”—meaning that they had protected the
southern approaches to the city and, for months, had diverted away from the
battle for the city considerable Arab manpower.
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